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The Law of the Sea After
Montego Bay
BERNARDO ZULETA*
THE MONTEGO BAY CEREMONY
On December 10, 1982, 119 States1 signed the United Nations
* Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, Special Representative of
the Secretary-General to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea. The opinions expressed in this statement are the author's and do not neces-
sarily reflect the official views of the Secretariat of the United Nations.
1. The signatories were the following.
African Group: Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Cape Verde, Chad, Congo, Djibouti,
Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya,
Lesotho, Liberia, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nige-
ria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tuni-
sia, Uganda, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania,
Upper Volta, Zambia, Zimbabwe;
Asian Group: Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burma, China, Cyprus, Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Yemen, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Iran,
Iraq, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Maldives,
Mongolia, Nauru, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore,
Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tuvalu, United Arab Emirates, Vanu-
atu, Viet Nam, Yemen;
Eastern European Group: Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic,
Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania,
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
Yugoslavia;
Latin American Group: Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay
Western European and Others Group: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zea-
land, Norway, Portugal, Sweden.
Namibia, represented by the United Nations Council for Namibia, and the Cook
Islands as a self-governing associated State with full competence to enter into
treaties in respect of matters governed by the Convention, also signed. U.N. Dep't
of Pub. Information, Press Release SEA/514, at 2 (Dec. 10, 1982).
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Convention on the Law of the Sea (Convention). They repre-
sented all regions of the world, all legal and political systems,
highly industrialized nations and all degrees of development in
Africa, Asia and Latin America. They included States with long
coastlines, States that are described as geographically disadvan-
taged with regard to ocean space, archipelagic States, large and
small island States, nations whose companies have invested in re-
search and development related to seabed mining and nations
that produce within their territories the same minerals that can
be found in the seabed.
Never in the history of treaty-making has such a large and va-
ried number of countries signed a convention on the day it was
opened for signature. The number of signatories exceeded the
most optimistic expectations and surprised those who had pre-
dicted that it would be difficult to obtain on the first day the fifty
signatures that were required to convene the Preparatory Com-
mission for the International Sea-Bed Authority and for the Inter-
national Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. The Montego Bay
meeting was remarkable also because of the level of representa-
tion2 and the substance of the statements made by 121
delegations. 3
On December 10, 1973, nine years to the day before the Conven-
tion was signed, Ambassador Hamilton Shirley Amerasinghe, the
late president of the Conference, announced an agreement that
was reached with gr~at difficulty concerning the distribution of
seats in the general committee, the three main committees and
the drafting committee of the Conference.4 On that occasion, he
stated that this had been made possible by the spirit of coopera-
tion and understanding shown by all concerned. That announce-
2. Eight States were represented by their Prime Minister or Deputy Prime
Minister; six States were represented by the Attorney General or Minister of Jus-
tice; fourteen States were represented by their Foreign Minister; and twenty-two
States were represented by Ministers of other portfolios or Vice-Ministers. UN-
CLOS Signing Ceremony, Montego Bay, Jamaica (Dec. 6-10, 1982) (text as deliv-
ered to the Secretariat, U.N., pending issue of official records).
3. Nauru, a small island-State in the Pacific, was represented by its presi-
dent, Hammer DeRoburt, whose moving statement reflected the importance of the
new legal regime for the subsistence and development of the 10,(00 inhabitants of
his nation: I
That is why we will always be grateful to the United Nations for having
made it possible, through such a body as this, for us to legislate for a tract
of the sea around our island that will be internationally recognized to a
defined extent and to claim as our own and to exploit and fish that area
for the economic well-being of our people. That opportunity has in turn
given rise to aspirations on our part to embark upon the creation of a fish-
ing industry, to fish that zone we have delineated by law-as we think
other, neighbouring countries have done or are doing.
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/PV.192, at 82 (1983).
4. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/SR.3 (1973).
476
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ment was the first evidence that the Conference could work by
consensus and could make every effort to accommodate the broad
variety of interests represented.
The Conference indeed worked painstakingly for nine years in
search of a consensus, bearing in mind that all matters pertaining
to ocean space are interrelated and need to be treated as a whole.
It had to devise novel procedures that were sometimes lengthy
and cumbersome, but were designed to allow different interests to
find common ground in the face of specific issues on the basis of
informal texts. As Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar
stated at the closing ceremony in Montego Bay:
The new law of the sea thus created is not simply the result of actions
and reactions on the part of the most powerful countries but the fruit of
the determination of an overwhelming majority of nations ... which came
together bringing a wind of change at the universal level .... The Confer-
ence has produced some basically non-doctrinal decisions, free from parti-
san creed. Its decisions ultimately derive more from a pragmatic
reconciliation of interests than from a collection of doctrines.... It is my
hope that States, when contemplating their sovereign decision whether to
sign and ratify the Convention, will be guided by this approach followed
by the Conference and will thus leave mythology aside in their own deci-
sion-making.
5
THE BEGINNING OF A NEW ERA
Most authorities agree that the Convention having been
adopted and signed, the law of the sea and international law in
general will never be the same.6 The first question that most legal
scholars are trying to answer concerns the position of States
which have not signed the treaty and are not likely to ratify it by
the time it enters into force, or, in other words, what will be the
law of the sea for non-parties. According to Jennings, "whatever
else that 'other' law may be, it will certainly not be the customary
international law of the sea that existed at the commencement of
the conference." 7 There is no question that customary law has
been developing during the past nine years, that the Conference
contributed to that process and that the Convention reflects prac-
tice and opinion regarding the uses of ocean space and the ra-
tional exploitation of its resources.
5. U.N. Dep't of Pub. Information, Press Release SG/SH/3365, SEA/507 (Dec.
10, 1982).
6. See, e.g., Jennings, Law-Making and Package Deal, in MILANGES OFFERTS
A PAUL REUTER 347 (1981).
7. Id. at 353.
It has been suggested that most provisions of the Convention,
including those parts dealing with navigation and overflight, re-
flect prevailing international practice and, therefore, can be in-
voked by non-parties as representing new customary
international law.8 This view does not seem to command broad
support. In fact, most statements made in Montego Bay reflect
the opposite view. In his opening statement, the president of the
Conference, Ambassador T.T.B. Koh of Singapore, said:
Although the Convention consists of a series of compromises, they form
an integral whole. This is why the Convention does not provide for reser-
vations. It is therefore not possible for States to pick what they like and
disregard what they do not like. In international law, as in domestic law,
rights and duties go hand in hand. It is therefore legally impermissible to
claim rights under the Convention without being willing to assume the
correlative duties.9
This view was shared by the vast majority of those who made
formal statements before the signing of the Final Act. The Dep-
uty Prime Minister and Secretary of State of External Affairs of
Canada, for example, expressed the following in his statement:
The Convention sets out a broad range of new rights and responsibili-
ties. If States may arbitrarily select those they will recognize or deny, we
will see not only the end of our dreams of a universal comprehensive Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea but perhaps the end of any prospect for
global co-operation on issues that touch the lives of all mankind. We must
not-we cannot-allow that to happen. The Law of the Sea Convention,
and the Convention alone, provides a firm basis for the peaceful conduct
of ocean affairs for the years to come. It must stand as one of the greatest
accomplishments of the United Nations and worthy of the support of
every nation.10
The Attorney-General of the United Republic of Tanzania elabo-
rated on the same point when he stated:
We cannot afford to choose what to take and what to reject, for that would
simply mean undoing the treaty. We are going to sign this Convention on
Friday with that understanding, and we appeal to those who are faced
with a temptation to dissociate themselves from this momentous product
of collective endeavor to resist such a temptation. 11
The delegate of Fiji expressed a similar point of view:
To attempt to rationalize that parts of the Convention are simply custom-
ary international law, and thereby to separate them from others, is to ig-
nore the fact that what was customary international law has been clarified
or modified and that if such provisions were preserved it was done as a
quid pro quo for other provisions. Any selective use of the Convention,
therefore, will be not only inappropriate but also unacceptable. 12
8. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/PV. 192, at 2 (1983) (statement of U.S. delegation).
9. U.N. Dep't of Pub. Information, Press Release SEA/500 (Dec. 6, 1982)
(statement of T.T.B. Koh, President, UNCLOS 1II).
10. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/PV.185, at 31-35 (1983) (statement of A. Maceachen,
Dep. Prime Minister, Canada).
11. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/PV.187, at 83 (1983) (statement of J.S. Warioba, Att'y
qen., United Republic of Tanzania).
12. Id. at 28-30 (statement of Satya Nandan, delegate of Fiji).
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Minister Gouzhenko of the Soviet Union took the same approach:
[O]ne cannot adopt a selective approach to the norms of international
law. The Convention is not a basket of fruit from which one can pick only
those which one fancies. As is well known, the new comprehensive Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea has been elaborated as a single and indivis-
ible instrument, as a package of closely interrelated compromise
decisions. 13
The delegate of Suriname emphasized that:
If they are to be taken seriously in future global negotiations, the major
industrialized States cannot simply pick up their marbles and walk away
just because they have not got everything they might have wanted.
The Convention is a compromise document prepared in the course of
lengthy and arduous negotiations. All States had to make concessions
during those negotiations. The States that fail to adopt the treaty should
not entertain the misguided hope that the Convention will just
evaporate. 14
Similarly, the Austrian delegate emphasized that he could not im-
agine a separation of rights and duties within the framework of
the Convention.15
Similar statements were made by, among others, the delegates
of Mexico, Cameroon, Australia, Brazil, Finland, Sri Lanka, Ke-
nya, Colombia, Chile, Barbados, Sierra Leone.' 6 All of these
statements reflect a generally-held view that State practice has
developed not only by the process of assertion and response, but
also as a consequence of intensive negotiations that consistently
took into consideration not only the rights of States but corre-
sponding duties as well.
It is worth mentioning that the terms "duty" and "obligation"
were unknown to or ignored by publicists and codifiers of the law
of the sea until rather recently. It has been said that traditional
law of the sea evolved around the concept of freedom of naviga-
tion, an expression linked with the concept of a narrow belt of ter-
ritorial sovereignty based on the cannon-range from the coast,
that served to disguise the expansion of maritime empires.' 7 It
13. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/PV.191, at 41 (1983) (statement of Timofey
Gouzhenko, Foreign Minister, USSR).
14. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/PV.187, at 19 (1983) (statement of H.E. Dr. H.
Naarendorp, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Suriname).
15. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/PV.192, at 52 (1983).
16. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/PV.185, at 58 (1983) (Mexico); id. at 38 (Cameroon);
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/PV.187, at 38-40 (1983) (Australia); id. at 17 (Brazil); id. at
22 (Finland); id. at 69-70 (Sri Lanka); id. at 52 (Kenya); id. at 93 (Colombia); U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/PV.189, at 11 (1983) (Chile); U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/PV.192, at 89-
90 (1983) (Barbados); id. at 96 (Sierra Leone).
17. J. Dupuy, L'octAN PARTAGik 11 (1979).
follows that States were not willing to impose on themselves du-
ties that would curtail their freedom.
The term "duty" appeared in the context of law of the sea for
the first time in 1956 in the heading of article 16 of the draft arti-
cles prepared by the International Law Commission'8 but was
promptly deleted and did not appear in the convention that was
adopted in 1958.19 The new Convention, by contrast, contains ex-
pressions of duty and obligation throughout the text. For every
right recognized for the coastal State, the port State, the flag
State, the landlocked State and the State applying for a plan of
work in the seabed area or sponsoring a potential operator, there
are countervailing obligations and duties. 2 0
The balance of rights and duties is further emphasized in arti-
cle 300 of the Convention:
States Parties shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed under
this Convention and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms
recognized in this Convention in a manner which would not constitute an
abuse of right.21
Rights and obligations were seen as so inextricably linked that
States agreed to settle any dispute between them concerning the
interpretation and application of the Convention, in some cases
through compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions 22 and
in other cases by submitting disputes to conciliation.23 This ma-
chinery for dispute settlement is obviously not available to coun-
tries that chose not to become parties to the Convention.
The question of whether non-parties can benefit from the Con-
vention does not, therefore, lend itself to an easy answer. As the
Committee on the Law of the Sea of the American branch of the
International Law Association has stated, certain important rights
sought and claimed by a non-party in areas such as freedom of
navigation cannot be considered fully secure.24 Different provi-
sions of the Convention which recognize freedoms to all States re-
quire that States with a particular geographical situation fulilml
18. Articles Concerning the Law of the Sea: Reference Guide Prepared by the
Secretariat, 11 U.N. GAOR C.6 Annex 2 (Agenda Item 53) at 64, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/
L.378 (1956).
19. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.LA.S. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S. 82.
20. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.62/122 (1982) (arts. 24, 39, 44, 56, 61, 62, 82, 94, 138, 192, 195, 202, 207, 208, 209,
210, 211, 212, 217, 239, 242, 249, 266, 279, and arts. 5 and 8 of Annex I) [hereinafter
cited as U.N. LOS Convention].
21. Id. art. 300.
22. Id. art. 286.
23. Id. art. 284.
24. Schneider, Report of the Comm. on Law of the Sea, 1981-82 INT'L LAW Ass'N
PROC. 111.
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certain obligations or abstain from practices that would hamper
those freedoms.25 Most jurists would find it difficult to accept that
a non-party could invoke those treaty provisions that contain spe-
cific obligations against a party to the Convention. The same
would also be true where the Convention calls on a State to
promptly release a vessel upon the posting of a reasonable bond26
or where it enjoins a coastal State to grant its consent for marine
scientific research projects provided certain conditions are met as
defined in the treaty.27 A closer examination of these problems
by international lawyers, diplomats and scholars is not likely to
offer more precise answers.
THE COMMON HERITAGE
The question of what will be the law of the sea for non-parties
is even more difficult to answer in connection with the explora-
tion and exploitation of the seabed and its resources beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction. The principle that such resources
are the common heritage of mankind has now been confirmed by
a treaty signed by an overwhelming majority of nations, broadly
representative of the international community, a treaty which is
likely to enter into force in the not-too-distant future.
The idea that there were goods in the oceans that could belong
to the indivisible patrimony of humankind and should not be
marked with individual seals of ownership was first suggested, in
recent times, by the eminent Latin American jurist, Andr~s
Bello.28 A few decades later, a French jurist, A.G. de Lapradelle,
made a similar suggestion and added that such resources should
be administered by a society of nations. 29 Most European jurists
dismissed this idea as a notion that was not in the interest of the
maritime powers, but the concept surfaced again in 1958 in a
statement made by Prince Wan Waithayakon of Thailand, the
president of the First United Nations Conference on the Law of
25. See U.N. LOS Convention, supra note 20, art. 42, para. 2 (laws and regula-
tions enacted by a State bordering straits shall not "have the practical effect of de-
nying, hampering or impairing the right of transit passage"); id. art. 44 ("States
bordering straits shall not hamper transit passage").
26. Id. art. 292, para. 1.
27. Id. art. 246, paras. 1, 3, 5.
28. A. BELLO, PRINCIPIOS DE DERECHO INTERNAcIoNAL 35 (Libereria Hermanos
Gernier, 1882).
29. A.G. DE LAPRADELLE, Le Droit de L'Etat Sur La Mer Territoriale, 5 REVUE
GtNtRALE DE Daorr INTERNATIONAL PuBLIC 309-47 (1898).
the Sea.30 But it was only when an awareness developed that the
manganese nodules in the seabed could become a new source of
supply of nickel, manganese, cobalt and copper for those industri-
alfzed nations that could not mine the same minerals within their
own land territories, that lawyers began to examine new ap-
proaches that would enable investors in seabed mining to acquire
exclusive rights with regard to specific mining sites in the seabed.
It became clear that traditional concepts of res nullius and res
communis could not provide the necessary political and legal cli-
mate that would encourage investments in research and develop-
ment for the mining of the oceans' riches. This may explain why
the common heritage approach was advocated by President John-
son of the United States in 1966,31 was accepted by the United
States delegation 32 when the General Assembly of the United Na-
tions adopted the Declaration of Principles,33 was reaffirmed by
President Nixon in 197034 and was the basis upon which all nego-
tiations took place throughout eleven sessions of the Law of the
Sea Conference.3 5
It is therefore clear that when Ambassador Pardo of Malta sug-
gested in 1967 that those resources should be treated as common
heritage,3 6 and when the General Assembly adopted the Declara-
tion of Principles,37 there was no suggestion that, in the absence
of a treaty, those resources could be treated as res nullius
through a nimble application by analogy of the traditional princi-
ple of freedom of the high seas. It is difficult to accept that a Con-
vention supported by a vast majority of the international
community can co-exist with another legal regime that would give
access to deep seabed resources on the basis of either the res nul-
lius or the res communis doctrine.
It is equally difficult to argue that there is an international cus-
30. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/SR.1 (1958).
31. President's Remarks at the Commissioning of the New Research Ship,
"The Oceanographer," 2 WEEKLY Compn. PRES. Doc. 930 (July 13, 1966).
32. 25 U.N. GAOR C.1 (1799th mtg.) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1799 (1970)
(statement of Ambassador John R. Stevenson).
33. Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and
Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2749, 25
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
34. See Statement by the President, United States Ocean Policy, 6 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 677 (May 23, 1970).
35. The United States, as is well known, was represented successively by Am-
bassador John R. Stevenson, Under-Secretary Carlyle E. Maw, Ambassador T.
Vincent Learson, Ambassador Elliot L. Richardson and Ambassador James Ma-
lone. For a narrative regarding the United States position throughout the years,
see Van Dyke and Yuen, "Common Heritage" v. "Freedom of the High Seas'"
Which Governs the Seabed?, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 493 (1982).
36. 22 U.N. GAOR C.1 (1515th mtg.) para. 6, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1515 (1967).
37. See supra note 33.
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tom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law, that would
enable any nation to engage in mining activities in the seabed.
Furthermore, most legal authorities in the various political sys-
tems would not support the idea that the traditional freedom of
the high seas extends to the living and non-living resources found
in the high seas.38 Any such claim would be contradicted by cus-
tomary law as well as treaty law. Resort to quotations by Hugo
Grotius, taken out of context, likewise do not provide any legal
basis from which to argue for the coexistence of two incompatible
legal high sea regimes.39
Only a treaty of universal acceptance can give a nation or a pri-
vate entrepreneur sponsored by a nation a valid right to explore
and exploit a specific portion of the seabed, if seabed mining is to
take place under international law. A Convention has been
adopted that gives the international community a regime and the
machinery to explore and exploit the common heritage, taking
due account of the diversity of interests that could be affected by
seabed mining activities. That regime, however, needs to be im-
plemented in a manner that will give greater certainty to the
rights and duties of all parties concerned. In order to make that
possible, the Conference has decided to establish a Preparatory
Commission 4o for the International Sea-Bed Authority and for the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.
38. See, e.g., 2 T. KRONmILLER, THE LAWFULNESS OF DEEP SEABED MINING
(1980).
39. When Grotius published his dissertation on the freedom of the high seas,
H. GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM (1608), his purpose was not to examine questions per-
taining to the exploitation of coastal fisheries or to the extraction of minerals from
the seabed. He was only trying to give legal arguments to reaffirm the right of the
Dutch to take part in the East Indian trade and in order to make his point, he elab-
orated at some length on the impossibility of applying the doctrine of acquisition
by prescription to the sea with regard to navigation and trade. In passing, he
noted that forests and rivers could be easily exhausted or depleted while the sea
could not be emptied by the same means. Had he been faced with the fact that
fisheries or mineral resources of the seabed can, in fact, be depleted or that the
marine environment can suffer damage from over-exploitation or from the use of
noxious substances, it is highly possible that he would have suggested that man
treat the marine environment with the same care and diligence that a prudent fa-
ther is called upon to exercise with regard to the preservation and sharing of the
family heritage.
40. Draft Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea, Annex I, res. I, para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/121 (1982).
THE ROLE OF THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION
Resolution 141 which was adopted together with the Convention,
establishes a mandate for the Preparatory Commission which de-
parts substantially from the traditional pattern for bodies of its
kind. Only States-signatories of the Convention can participate in
the making of decisions, while those which signed the Final Act
will be entitled to participate as observers.
In addition to drafting rules of procedure for the Assembly, the
Council, the Economic and Planning Commission and the Legal
and Technical Commission that have been established under Part
XI of the Convention, the Preparatory Commission will have to
draft rules, regulations and procedures on conditions of prospect-
ing, exploration and exploitation to be submitted to the Authority
and to be applied transitionally by it, pending approval.42 This is
equally true of rules, regulations and procedures on financial
management and the internal administration of the Authority.43
The Commission will also have to make recommendations regard-
ing the Enterprise, including different operational options, project
formulations, staffing requirements, choice of technologies and
projection of financial requirements. 44 It will also have to under-
take studies and make recommendations on problems which
would be encountered by developing landbased producers, in-
cluding studies and recommendations on the establishment of a
compensation fund. In the drafting of those rules and regulations,
the Preparatory Commission will have to make some decisions
that could well affect the acceptability of the new regime for those
countries that would have to bear the largest financial burdens or
for those whose companies would have to make commitments
with regard to seabed mining technology.
In drafting the rules of procedure of the Assembly, for example,
the Preparatory Commission will have to determine the proce-
dure for establishing an agreed scale of assessment.45 Such scale
of assessment will apply to the administrative budget of the Au-
thority. The Assembly's rules will also have to provide for criteria
and factors for the funding necessary to enable the Enterprise to
explore and exploit one mine site, to transport, process and mar-
ket the minerals recovered therefrom and to meet the internal ad-
ministrative expenses.46
41. Id.
42. Id. para. 5(g).
43. Id.
44. Id. para. 8.
45. U.N. LOS Convention, supra note 20, art. 160, para. 2(e).
46. Id. para. 2(f) (ii).
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As another example, in drafting the rules, regulations and pro-
cedures on conditions of prospecting, exploration and exploitation
the Preparatory Commission will have to establish criteria to de-
termine whether a technology used by a contractor or an equally
efficient and useful technology can be found on the open market
on fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions. 47 It will
also have to establish regulations and procedures for the Author-
ity to determine whether a disclosure of information pertaining to
technology is contrary to the essential interests of the security of
a State Party. 8
But the Preparatory Commission will have a more immediate
task to perform: in accordance with resolution 1149 which governs
preparatory investments in pioneer activities relating to
polymetallic nodules, France, Japan, India, the USSR or a State
enterprise of each of those States and the four private seabed
mining consortia whose components possess the nationality or
are effectively controlled by Belgium, Canada, the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States,
are recognized as pioneer investors, provided they have expended
certain minimum amounts prior to January 1, 1983.50 Developing
States are given the same opportunity if they have met the same
expenditure requirements prior to June 1, 1985.51
In order to be registered as a pioneer investor and, therefore,
enjoy the exclusive right to carry out preparatory activities in a
specific mine site, the pioneer investor has to be certified by a sig-
natory of the Convention. States-signatories which intend to cer-
tify a pioneer investor must ensure that areas in respect of which
applications are made, do not overlap with one another or with ar-
eas previously allocated as pioneer areas. If such conflicts have
not been resolved by March 1,. 1983, the prospective certifying
State must arrange for the submission of all such claims to bind-
ing arbitration not later than May 1, 1983 and to be completed by
December 1, 1984.52 Resolution II provides that a pioneer investor
47. Id. Annex III, art. 5, para. 3(a).
48. Id. art. 302.
49. Draft Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea, Annex I, res. H, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/121 (1982).
50. Id. para. l(a)(ii).
51. Id. para. 1(a) (iii).
52. Id. para. 5(c).
may alter its nationality and sponsorship from that prevailing at
the time of its registration as a pioneer investor to that of any
State Party to the Convention which has effective control over the
pioneer investor.53
Within six months upon entry into force of the Convention the
Authority must approve applications for plans of work and give
production authorizations to any pioneer investors that have met
the requirements laid down by the Convention.54 In order to im-
plement this novel method of protecting preparatory investments
compatible with the Convention, the Preparatory Commission
will have to adopt rules and procedures regarding receipt,
processing and registration of applications, processing of informa-
tion on the resolution of conflicts with respect to overlapping
claims, designation of reserved and pioneer areas, performance
requirements including periodic expenditures.
In order to preserve the balance between the role of the pio-
neers and that of the Enterprise, resolution II enjoins pioneers to
carry out exploration at the request of the Commission in areas
that will be reserved for the Enterprise, on the basis that the
costs so incurred plus interest shall be reimbursed.5 5 It also pro-
vides for training at all levels for personnel designated by the
Commission and makes it mandatory for certifying States to per-
form obligations relating to the transfer of technology and the
funding of the Enterprise.56
It is conceivable that the Convention may enter into force upon
its ratification by sixty countries long before the first seabed min-
ing operator is ready to embark on actual exploitation of the mine
site. The question of the functioning of the Enterprise will only
become relevant if and when nations and private investors are
ready to finance their own undersea mining projects. In other
words, if large investments in seabed mining on one side of the
so-called "parallel system" become feasible, the Enterprise is
likely to become a rather attractive partner, at least for some
stages of a seabed mining project.
It is therefore clear that the Preparatory Commission could well
become the forum where solutions can be found in a pragmatic
way to enable seabed investors and the Enterprise to begin com-
mercial recovery in a manner acceptable to all parties concerned,
if and when the metal market conditions can justify the substan-
tial investments needed. In that sense the work of the Prepara-
53. Id. para. 10(c).
54. Id. para. 8.
55. Id. para. 12(a) (i).
56. Id. para. 12(a)(ii)-(iii).
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tory Commission will largely determine the flexibility of seabed
mining.
The unique role of the Preparatory Commission was recognized
in a number of declarations made in Montego Bay. Austria, for
instance, felt that much would depend on the faithfulness to the
principles of consensus and comprehensiveness of approach.
5 7
Canada stated that if the Preparatory Commission adopts a real-
istic and pragmatic attitude, the future is assured.5 8 Chile also
thought that the future of the Convention would greatly depend
on how the Commission proceeded.5 9 Colombia urged that the
Commission work to facilitate universality rather than make it
more difficult.60 In France's view, imperfections with regard to
technology transfer and the financing of the Authority should be
corrected by the Commission when it drafts the rules, regulations
and procedures for the future mining system.61 Italy thought the
Commission should take a pragmatic approach in ironing out diffi-
culties with regard to seabed mining.62 Norway expressed a be-
lief that the Commission's work may be crucial in making the
Convention universal.63 Uruguay thought the Commission could
play a role in that regard by the broad use of its powers.64
CONCLUSION
The Montego Bay signing ceremony65 seems to have given all
nations a clear message. It has proven that the United Nations
can be an effective forum for the negotiation of complex issues,
and that when given the choice, nations large and small prefer to
operate under the rule of law to reconcile conflicting interests and
settle their disputes by peaceful means.
It is hoped that the work of the Preparatory Commission will
enable those States that still have misgivings regarding the new








65. Historians should record the fact that the additional expenditures con-
nected with the holding of the signing ceremony in Montego Bay were defrayed by
the government of Jamaica, whose generous hospitality made that meeting a most
memorable occasion.
legal regime to reexamine their position, not by applying to every
treaty provision the worst-case analysis method, but by accepting
that other nations can discharge their obligations in good faith
and exercise their rights in a manner which would not constitute
an abuse of right. The experience gained in the nine years of ne-
gotiations justifies that hope.
